

Topic: Methodological issues concerning the study of municipal and subnational elections outcome

Title: Multicameral Voting Cohesion Games

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Abstract

Most of the parliaments are based on a bicameral system where propositions have to be approved by both chambers. Then a political party, for one certain coalition, can be crucial in one chamber and not in the other. Usually the problem can be studied by building a unified game, related to the two chambers, where the global powers can be calculated.

Concerning cohesion games, some coalitions among parties could be possible in theory, but they are unrealizable (or have low probability of materializing) if the parties involved have very different ideologies. It is necessary to take this into consideration when we compute the relative powers.

In this work, a model is built that takes into consideration both problems. An automatic calculation algorithm is elaborated and is applied to the current situations in some countries, considering the location of the parties on the left-right axis.

Short References

Gambarelli, G. (1999), 'Minimax Apportionments', *Group Decision and Negotiation*, 8, 441-461.

Gambarelli, G. and A. Palestini (2007) "Minimax Multi-District Apportionments" *Power Measures IV - a Special Issue of Homo Oeconomicus* (G. Gambarelli, ed.), Vol. 24, n. 3/4, Accedo Verlagsgesellschaft, München, .335-356.