The Italian Parliament is currently examining an ambitious constitutional reform to introduce a system known as “premierato”. Proposed by the Meloni government, this reform seeks to strengthen the Prime Minister through direct election, enhance government stability, and align the governing majority more closely with voters’ preferences.

This event will discuss the potential impact of the proposed reform on the duration of Italian governments, also considering alternative hypothetical reforms, such as the introduction of a constructive vote of no confidence. This presentation draws on a paper that uses a comparative dataset covering 27 European countries from the end of World War II onward. It applies a survival analysis within a competing risks framework to estimate the likelihood of discretionary government termination under different constitutional arrangements, modelled on an Italy-like scenario.

The speakers will explain that, according to the findings, the ‘premierato’ reform—compared to the current system—would reduce the likelihood of Italian cabinets being replaced within the same legislature, while increasing their vulnerability to early elections. Overall, the reform would lengthen the average lifespan of Italian cabinets. However, greater cabinet stability could be achieved through a constitutional revision introducing a constructive vote of no confidence.

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